Symmetric Telecom Regulation, Competition and Investment

  • Anders Henten CMI, Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark
  • Morten Falch CMI, Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark
Keywords: Symmetric telecoms, symmetric regulation, European electronic Communication Code, telecom competition, telecom investment


Symmetric telecoms regulation, where it is not only the operators with significant market power (SMP) at national or large geographical scales which are subject to special access obligations, has been on the agenda for long. However, emphasis has hitherto been on asymmetric regulation, but during the past few years, symmetric regulation has gradually gained weight in different EU countries, and the new European Electronic Communications Code also aims at putting more emphasis on symmetric regulation. The paper identifies the reasons behind symmetric access regulation possibly coming to play a more prominent role in EU telecoms regulation, the scope of symmetric regulation and how it is being articulated, and what the possible implications of symmetric regulation could be on the level of investment. The contribution of the paper is to discuss these different elements of understanding the potential role of symmetric regulation.


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Author Biographies

Anders Henten , CMI, Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark

Anders Henten is Professor at section for Communication, Media and Information technologies (CMI) – an interdisciplinary research and teaching section specializing in ICT services, digital media and cyber security at the Department of Electronic Systems at Aalborg University in Copenhagen. He is a graduate in communications and international development studies from Roskilde University in Denmark (1989) and holds a PhD in ICT from the Technical University of Denmark (1995). He has worked professionally in the area of communications economy and policy for more than 30 years.

Morten Falch, CMI, Department of Electronic Systems, Aalborg University, Copenhagen, Denmark

Morten Falch is Associate Professor at Center for Communication, Media and Information Technologies (CMI) located at Aalborg University Copenhagen. He holds a bachelor in Mathematic, a master degree in economics and a Ph.D. and has since 1988 specialised in research on socio-economic issues related to Information and Communication technologies.

He has participated in 40 research projects in the telematics area more than a third of these have been funded by EU. He has also conducted a large number of consultancies for national and international organisations such as ITU, UNCTAD, the World Bank and the National Telecom Agencies in Denmark, Norway and Sweden.


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